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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Pl.aintif/-Respondent,
vs.
GEORGE WILLIAM JACKSON,
Defendant-A pp ell.ant.

Case No.
11340

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
On January 5, 1968, the appellant was charged with
the crime of murder in the first degree in connection with
the shooting of one Willie Henry Watson on January 4,
1968. The appellant was later bound over to the Third
District Court to stand trial for the accused crime.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a four day trial which began on April 2, 1968,
and concluded on April 6, 1968, the jury found the appellant guilty of murder in the second degree. This is an
appeal from that conviction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks affirmation of the lower court's
judgment and appellant's conviction.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent is in general agreement with the statement of facts as contained in the appellant's brief with
the following exceptions, additions and alterations:
1. While appellant in his brief states he was the
"sole economic contributor," the record presents quite a
different picture in that the partners were jointly responsible for the payment of money borrowed and fixtures purchased which constituted major portions of the partnership
property (Tr.275-276, 279, 310).
2. It should be emphasized that while the appellant
insists that he saw the deceased pull a gun (Tr.300-301,
329-331), no gun was found (Tr.185, 223), nor was any
explanation for its disappearance presented during the
course of the trial.
3. The testimonial evidence not only showed conclusively "that the Defendant intended to inflict bodily harm,"
but that he in fact intended to kill. Mr. Banks asked the
question, "And you wanted to be sure he was dead, didn't
you?" And the appellant answered, "That's correct." (Tr.
331).
4. Appellant's statement as to what questions he contends remained in the balance would have been more appropriately contained in the body of his argument.
5. While appellant contends in his brief that "four
photographs of the deceased taken from various positions
. . . were placed in evidence," i.t should be noted from the
photographs themselves (State exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 8) that
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only two positions were involved and that these exhibits
were merely a black and white (Exhibits 2 and 8) and a
colored slide (Exhibits 3 and 4) taken from each of these
two positions.
6. It cannot go without note that the appellant's presentation of the facts relating to the partnership should be
weighed in light of the fact that his partner is no longer
around to testify as to what might actually have been their
relationship.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE CERTAIN PHOTOGRAPHS OF
THE DECEASED TAKEN SHORTLY AFTER HIS
DEATH.
It is well recognized that the admissibility of photo-

graphs is a matter of judicial discretion and will not be
disturbed unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion.
PeO'ple v. Shiers, 160 Cal. App.2d 364, 324 P.2d 981 (1968);
Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810 (1951);
Slate v. Poe, 21 U.2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968); State v.
Renzo, 21 C.2d 205, 443 P.2d 392 (1968).
At the same time, the test normally applied to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion is to
weigh the probative value of the photographs against any
probable prejudice to the defendant. State v. Poe, supra,
State v. Renzo, swpra. The respondent submits that when
this test is applied, it must be found that the photographs
\'VTere probative of the issues.
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A. Photographs were probative of the issues.

It must be remembered that the State had the burden
of proving appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, that of first degree murder. To do so,
it necessarily had to prove the elements of that crime,
enumerated in Section 76-30-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953),
which in part provides:

Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in
wait or any other kind of wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing; or committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any
arson, rape, burglary or robbery; or perpetrated
from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other
than the one who is killed; or perpetrated by any
act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and
evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of human
life; - is murder in the first degree. . ..
Further, the entire entry of a plea of not guilty puts
in issue every material allegation of the information. Utah
Oode Ann. Section 77-24-4 (1953).
Colored slides of the deceased were held properly admitted for their probative value in demonstrating malice afterthought, and whether defendant
had an abandoned and malignant heart at the time
of the killing and there admissibility, was not an
abuse of discretion even though they were gruesome.
People v. Taylor, 11 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1961).
This Court in the Renzo case, supra, citing a Missouri
case, had the following to say concerning this matter:
In State v. Moore, 303 S.W. 2d 60 (Mo. 1957),
the defendant was prosecuted for the murder of his
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wife. He claimed that it was reversible error to admit four pictures of the deceased showing the wound
. . . The State offered the exhibit on the theory that
the location of the wound showed that defendant
acted consciously and took accurate aim when firing
the gun. The court said:
The rule as to the admissibility of this sort of
visual evidence is well settled. Demonstrative
evidence of this character is admissible if it
tends to connect the accused with the crime, or
to prove the identify of the deceased, or show
of nature of the wound, or throw any relevant
light upon a material matter at issue.

* * *

Even if we assume that there was evidence
upon all of the material facts shown by the
photographs it does not follow that the exhibits
were inadmissible.
In answer to a defendant's contention that photos of the
body of deceased should have been excluded, the court in
People v. Toth, 6 Cal. Rprt. 372 (1960), replied:
In the trial of a charge of murder in the second
degree it is essential for the People to establish malice
aforethought. Such malice may be shown by the
extent and severity of the injuries inflicted upon the
victim and by the condition in which the victim was
left by the attacker.
Such photos have also been held admissible: To show
the condition of the body, or to indicate the nature or extent
of wounds or injuries thereon, Reizenstien v. St.ate, 165
Neb. 865, 87 N.W.2d 560 (1958), manner of death, location,
severity, and number of wounds, State v. Eubanks, 240 La.
552, 124 So. 2o 543 ( 1966), amount of force used, People
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v. Kolep, 29 Ill. 1160, 193 N.E. 2d 753 (1963), and the severity and violence of the assault on the deceased, Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 (1963); the
fact that such photos may be gruesome notwithstanding.
A case very much in point is that of State v. Russell, 106
Utah 116, 145 P.2d 1003 (1944) in which this Court said:
. . . The pictures of the deceased, taken after her
death and showing her wounds, were clearly admissible. Even though the defendant did admit the
killing, he did not admit the intent to kill and the
nature of the wounds may be material on that point.
The pictures showed the nature of the wounds more
clearly than the testimony of witnesses could. . ..
In a recent Idaho murder case, the defendant was
charged with murdering a three year old child by kicking
it to death. The court there held that the charge involved
the element of malice with which the crime was committed
and photographs showing the battered nude body of the deceased helped to establish the malice. State v. Martinez, 92
Idaho 183, 439 P.2d 691 (1968).
The court, in rejecting defendant's claim that these
photographs had no probative value and served only to
arouse the passions of the jury, stated at 439 P.2d 696:
The general rule is that photographs of the
victim in a prosecution for homicide, duly verified
and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful representations of the victim at the time in question are,
in the discretion of the trial court, admissible in evidence as an aid to the jury in arriving at a fair understanding of the evidence, proof of the corpus
delicti, extent of injury, condition and identification
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of the body, or for their bearing on the question
of the degree or atrociousness of the crime, even
though such photographs may have the additional
effect of tending to excite the emotions of the jury.
(See generally 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law Sec. 852 [1]
[1961]; 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence Secs. 785-788 and
798 [1967]; 159 A.L.R. 1413 [ 1945]. 73 A.L.R.2d 769
[1960]. See also State v. Kleier, 69 Idaho 278, 206
P.2d 513 [1949].)
The generalizations above referred to have been
specifically applied with respect to homicide cases
involving the admissibility into evidence of photographs for the designated purpose of determining
the atrociousness or malice with which the crime
was committed.
The respondent submits that the photographs used were
helpeful in assisting the jury in determining whether the
requisite intent was present, a question upon which the appellant himself places much emphasis. It is also significant
that State exhibits 3 and 8 were used only to depict the victim's position relative to the surrounding fixtures, and
appear to have been taken from the probable position of the
appellant at the time of the shooting. What could! be more
probative than a picture of the deceased and his surroundings taken from the position and angle of the actual shooting?
As the above cases also indicate, the location and number of the wounds along with the relative position of the
victim after the slaying have particular probative value
especially in the case of first degree murder. The position
of the wounds and the accuracy with which the shots were
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fired become increasingly probative where the defense of
self defense is asserted as in the instant case.
B.

Photographs were not prejudicial to the defendant.

Before dealing directly with the issue of the photos
being "prejudicial," it would appear appropriate to answer
appellant's repeated contention that the cause lay in a "precarious balance" prior to the admission of the photographs
in question, and that such admission violently upset that balance to the appellant's detriment. The respondent submits,
and the evidence clearly indicates, that if any "precarious
balance" existed, Lady Justice was tip-toeing the line between first and second degree murder and not between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. If the respondent might conjecture, it was probably but for the age
of the appellant that he was not convicted of first degree
murder.
It is difficult to fully appreciate this "precarious bal-

ance" contention when the appellant also uses in his brief
such phrases as " ... overwhelming case against the Defendant ... " andi "With its case (the States) in such a strong
position. . . ."
While the appellant relies heavily on the Poe case in his
claim of prejudicial error resulting from the admission of
the photographs in question, the two cases are dissimilar in
most respects. In the Poe case the photographs were taken
after an autopsy had been performed on the victim.
As a matter of fact, it would appear from Chief Justice
Crockett's concurring opinion in the Renzo case that the
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main reason for the Poe reversal was that the photographs
were not depictive of the accused's actions. In reference
to the Poe case, he said:
But the prosecution went beyond any necessity
of proof and introduced the offending colored slides
relating to something quite separate and apart from
the crime, and which the def end.ant had nothing to
do with causing: the gory procedures of a pathologist. (It should be notedi that Justice Callister, who
wrote the majority opinion in the Poe case, concurred
in this concurring opinion of the Chief Justice.)
The probative value of the photographs for this and
other reasons was highly questionable. Perhaps most significant, as the verdict in the Poe case indicated, was that the
defendant's life did in fact hang in the balance. It would
appear from what Chief Justice Crockett further said in
his concurring opinion in the Renzo case, that the verdict
reached by the jury can itself be an index of the prejudicial
affect of evidence. Speaking of the Poe case, he said:
. . . This lack of probative purpose, coupled with
the fact that there was a definite likelihood that
they would have the affect of suggesting brutality
in the crime, and thus provoking resentment and
inflaming the passions of the jury against the accused, (which likelihood incidentally appears to have
been borne out by the verdict), leads us to believe
that it was prejudicial error to admit the pictures
in the Poe case.
After a thorough look at the facts and circumcstances
of this case, can it be candidly said that the verdict of second degree murder reached by the jury is in any way reflective of passioru or prejudice? The respondent submits that
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the verdict in the instant case can in no way be construed
to raise the implication that the jury was in any way prejudiced against the appellant by way of the photographs admitted. On the contrary, and, as has been previously mentioned, it would appear that the jury afforded the 'appellant every benefit of the doubt, even when the doubt may
have appeared unreasonable.
While the appellant repeatedly contends in his brief
that the purpose of the photographs was to "arouse the jury
to the point where they would infer malice, pre-meditation
and deliberation on the part of th~ Defendant," it is apparent, in view of the verdict, that pre-meditation and deliberation, not being elements of second degree murder, need not
have been found. The facts clearly establish malice.
It is the respondent's contention that the probative value
of the photographs far outweighed any possible prejudice
against the appellant. It is submitted that the photographs
do illustrate depravity, do give proof of pre-meditation and
deliberation (close shot group or pattern), do prove or indicate proof that deceased died as a result of the wounds
(show he was shot four or five times in the head). It is
further submitted that the verdict, when viewed in light of
the facts presented at the trial, clearly indicates that the jury
was in no way prejudiced against the appellant in their
finding of second degree murder.
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POINT II.
FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE ADMITTANCE OF
THE PHOTOGRAPHS AT THE TIME OF TRIAL IS
FATAL TO THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAL.
The validity of Point II of this argument must of necessity be weighed in connection with Point I, for it would appear from Utah law that the leniency with which the appellate courts are to treat non-objections of counsel toquestionable evidence is directly proportional to the probable
prejudicial affect of that same evidence.
The respondent submits that by virtue of showing that
the appellant was not prejudiced by the admittance of the
photographs, his failure to object provides the second basis
for his appeal to fail.
It will be noted that the excerpted portion of State v.
Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936), as cited in appellant's
brief, contains the statement:

. . . we think that when palpable error is ma.de to
appear on the face of the record and to manifest
prefudice of the accused, the Court has power to
notice such error and to correct the same, though
no formal exception was taken to the ruling. (Emphasis by respondent.)
Can it be said that "palpable error is made to appear
on the face of the record" in the instant case? In this case
is it not more logical to give emphasis to the opening lines
of the statement from which the above is takeru where the
Court said:
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We wish not to depatit from the rule laid down
in this jurisdiction that in ordinary cases on appeal
errors relating to instructions or refusing requests
to instruct wm not be considered or reviewed unless
exceptions thereto were properly taken by the party
complaining.
While the above deals with the instructing of the jury,
this Court has been even more forceful in expounding the
rule as it applies to the admission of evidence.
In State v. N e"UJon, 12 U.2d 177, 364 P.2d 409 ( 1961)
the court said:
We here note that we do not disagree with the
contention that even in the absence of an objection
this court might nevertheless take note of and correct an egregious error. But this could properly be
done ·Only in an unusual case where there was some
substantial error unobjected to by inadvertence or
neglect of sounsel and where it was of such critical
importance that it awears likely that an unjust
conviction resulted therefrom. (Emphasis added.)
A partial explanation for this doctrine is contained in
State v. Smith, 16 U.2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965) where this
court said:
He (defendant's counsel) urges the prerogative,
which we recognize, of noticing palpable and significant error which may have deprived an accused of
a fair trial, under special circumstances where the
interests of justice so require, even in the absence
of such objections. However, we emphasize that this
is done rarely and with caution in an awareness of
the importance of timely and proper objections. The
purpose of this is to call attention to rulings claimed
to be erroneous at a time when they may be correct-
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ed; and also to guard against any deliberate withholding of objections with an ulterior purpose in
mind of later taking advantage of errors committed.
A Washington Court in State v. Payne, 25 Wash. 2d 407,
171P.2d227 (1946) which dealt with an abortion conviction
and the admissibility of certain photographs has stated:
He (defendant's counsel) contends that the court
erred in permitting photographs of gruesome objects
to go to the jury.
A complete answer to this assignment is that no objection was made to the admission in evidence of the
pictures in question. In any event, the admissibility
of pictures shown to be competent, relevant and
material is beyond controversy. A qualification of
the rule based upon degrees of unpleasantness would
produce nothing but confusion in the law.
The respondent submits that the photographs were not
prejudicial and that if by some stretch of the imagination
they should be construed to be so, that the degree of prejudice produced was not such as to cause this Court to disregard the fact that counsel during trial failed to object to
their admittance into evidence. For this additional reason,
the appellant's attempt at appeal should fail.
CONCLUSION
The respondent submits that when the probative value
of the photographs in question is weighed against the contended prejudice to the defendant, that the lower court's
ruling as to the admissibility of the evidence must be sustained, and that in any event, this Court should be precluded
from entertaining points on appeal that were not objected
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to in the trial court. The Respondent further submits that
the evidence presented at the trial, with or without the
ph:Otograp'hs in question, was more than thait needed .for the
verdict returned and that the conviction by the lower court
should be affirmed in all respects.
Re~pectfully

submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
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